Influence of the Will

But Aristotle by no means overlooked the necessity with a view to persuasion, properly so termed, of calling into action some motive that may influence the will; it is plain that whenever he speaks with reprobation of an appeal to the passions, his meaning is, the excitement of such feelings as ought not to influence the decision of the question in hand. A desire to do justice may be called, in Dr.

Campbell's wide acceptation of the term, a "passion" or "affection"; this is what ought to influence a judge; and no one would ever censure a pleader for striving to excite and heighten this desire; but if the decision be influenced by an appeal to anger, pity, etc., the feelings thus excited being such as ought not to have operated, the judge must be allowed to have been unduly biased; and that this is Aristotle's meaning is evident from his characterizing the introduction of such topics as "foreign to the matter in hand." It is evident, also, that as the motives which ought to operate will be different in different cases, the same may be objectionable and not fairly admissible, in one case, which in another would be perfectly allowable.

An instance occurs in Thucydides, in which this is very judiciously and neatly pointed out; in the debate respecting the Mityleneans, who had been subdued after a revolt, Cleon is introduced contending for the justice of inflicting on them capital punishment, to which Diodotus is made to reply that the Athenians are not sitting in judgment on the offenders, but in deliberation as to their own interest, and ought, therefore, to consider not the right they may have to put the revolters to death, but the expediency or inexpediency of such a procedure.

In judicial cases, on the contrary, any appeal to the personal interests of the judge, or even to public expediency, would be irrelevant. In framing laws, indeed, and (which comes to the same thing) giving those decisions which are to operate as precedents, the public good is the object to be pursued; but in the mere administering of the established laws it is inadmissible.

Improper Motives

There are many feelings, again, which it is evident should in no case be allowed to operate; as envy, thirst for revenge, etc., the excitement of which by the orator is to be reprobated as an unfair artifice; but it is not the less necessary to be well acquainted with their nature, in order to allay them when previously existing in the hearers, or to counteract the efforts of an adversary in producing or directing them. It is evident, indeed, that all the weaknesses, as well as the powers of the human mind, and all the arts by which the sophist takes advantage of these weaknesses, must be familiarly known by a perfect orator; who, though he may be of such a character as to disdain employing such arts, must not want the ability to do so, or he would not be prepared to counteract them. An acquaintance with the nature of poisons is necessary to him who would administer antidotes.

Prejudice Existing Against Excitement of Feelings

There is, I conceive, no point in which the idea of dishonest artifice is in most people's minds so intimately associated with that of rhetoric, as the address to the feelings or active principles of our nature. This is usually stigmatized as "an appeal to the passions instead of the reason"; as if reason alone could ever influence the will, and operate as a motive; which it no more can, than the eyes, which show a man his road, can enable him to move from place to place; or than a ship provided with a compass, can sail without a wind. It may be said indeed, with truth, that an orator does often influence the will by improper appeals to the passions; but it is no less true that he often imposes on the understanding of his hearers by sophistical arguments: yet this does not authorize us to reprobate the employment of argument. But it seems to be commonly taken for granted, that whenever the feelings are excited they are of course overexcited. Now so far is this from the fact--so far is it from being true, that men are universally, or even generally, in danger of being misled in conduct by an excess of feeling, that the reverse is at least as often the case. The more generous feelings, such as compassion, gratitude, devotion, nay, even rational and rightly-directed self-love, hope, and fear, are oftener defective than excessive: and that, even in the estimation of the parties themselves, if they are well-principled, judicious, reflective, and candid men. Do the feelings of such a man, when contemplating, for instance, the doctrines and the promises of the Christian religion, usually come up to the standard which he himself thinks reasonable? And not only in the case of religion, but in many others also, a man will often wonder at, and be rather ashamed of, the coldness and languor of his own feelings, compared with what the occasion calls for: and even makes efforts to rouse in himself such emotions as he is conscious his reason would approve.

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